I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalised in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that for each feasible (finite) choice situation, the choice coincides with the uncovered set of T . This notion of rationality explains not only cyclical and contextdependent choices observed in practice, but also provides testable restrictions on observable choice behavior.
Introduction
The standard model of choice (under certainty) posit the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), and so view choice as the outcome of the maximisation of a preference ordering.
1 Despite its intuitive appeal, there is a large body of experimental findings that is inconsistent with this theory: choices may be cyclic (i.e., only x is chosen over y, only y is chosen over z, and only z is chosen over x) and context-dependent (i.e., the choice from a feasible set depends on the presence or absence of other alternatives).
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Since these patterns of choice do not seem correlated in any way to the complexity of the decision situation that a decision-maker (DM) may face when called upon, procedure. In a first step, a DM shrinks the feasible set by an acyclic preference relation (possibly incomplete). In a second step, he compares the surviving alternatives according to a covering domination inferred from the entire feasible set. The covering domination provides him with a "reason" to choose uncovered and non-dominated alternative from the set.
Is it possible to explain both kinds of violations of WARP by means of one-stage choice procedure which is naively simple, preserves some form of maximality, and provides 1 See, for instance, Suzumura (1983 Roelofsma and Read (2000) .
the DM with a "justification" of his choice whenever it does not exist a non-dominated alternative? In this paper I provide an affirmative answer to this question.
I propose the following choice rule dubbed uncovered set rule: a DM deems the alternative x choosable from every feasible set whenever it has the property that it dominates every other available one, say z, either directly (x is chosen over z) or in two pairwise comparisons (a distinct alternative y exists such that x is chosen over y which in turn is chosen over z -two steps, so indirect, dominance of x over z).
The uncovered set rule has been extensively studied in social science disciplines, and is viewed in economics as weaker generalization of the standard maximality hypothesis (see, for instance, Miller (1980) ). Of the existing literature on the uncovered set rule two works are particularly relevant here. A full characterization of the uncovered set rule has been provided by means of a family of rationales, one for each feasible set (Duggan (1997) ). Yet, using a tournament, it has been shown that the uncovered set choice rule is the least choice rule obeying properties relating choices across tournaments and across sets (Moulin (1986) ). 4 The goal of this paper is to identify the structure of the uncovered set rule in term of properties of choice from sets using a single fixed tournament T defined over all feasible sets.
The suggested choice rule is able to capture both kind of violations of WARP because when applied to every feasible set it constructs a dominance hierachy among alternatives, which may depends on a number of attributes and, above all, on what are the alternatives of the set under consideration. Moreover, one of its central feature is simplicity: the choosable alternative has the property to dominate every other available one in at most two pairwise choices. Last, but not least, experimental studies can be conducted on the suggested choice rule because it provides testable restrictions on observable choice. 4 A companion paper of Moulin's work shows that the minimal covering set choice rule corresponding to some alternatives of the uncovered set choice rule is the least choice rule obeying consistency requirements of different nature (Dutta, (1988) is never chosen from every element of the collection, then it will never be the case that x is chosen from their union. Therefore, it assures that x cannot "come as a surprise" in a larger set containing y because x is never chosen while y is an available alternative. The
Additive Property states that given a set A not containing y, if x is uniquely chosen from a set A because it dominates all other available alternatives in pairwise choices, then x must still be chosen from A ∪ {y} if an alternative of A is chosen over y. In other words, the fact that x dominate directly or indirectly, and not too indirectly, y provides the DM with a "reason" to still choose x from A ∪ {y}.
In the next section I formalise and characterise the uncovered set choice rule, in section 3 I look for the difference between the suggested choice rule and the top-cycle one, while section 4 concludes.
2 Uncovered Set Choice Rule
Nomenclature
Let a finite number of distinct alternatives be collected in X; denote by X the collection of all nonempty subsets of X. Given an element A of X containing two alternatives (say,
x and y), the collection of nonempty proper subsets of A containing x and y is denoted
A choice rule f is a correspondence from X to X that assigns to each element A of X a choice set contained in A. The choice set is never empty for every A of X (decisive axiom). Saying f is resolute means that the choice set from binary sets is a single unit set.
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A binary relation T on X is a tournament if it is asymmetric [for every pair of alternatives {x, y} in X, no yT x if xT y] and complete [for every pair {x, y} in X, xT y or yT x].
I read xT y as follows: x dominates y in the pairwise comparison {x, y}. Given three alternatives x, y, and z of X, I say that y is dominated by x in two steps if x dominates z which dominates y [i.e., xT zT y]. Note that a restriction of T to an element A of X , denoted by T |A, is a tournament.
Definition 1 Given a tournament T on X and an element A of X , the uncovered set of T on A, denoted by uc (T |A), consists of distinct alternatives of A that dominate every other alternative of A in at most two steps: x in uc (T |A) if, and only if, for every y of A − {x}: xT y or there exists z in A − {x, y} such that xT z and zT y.
Definition 2 A choice rule f is said to be an uncovered set choice rule if there exists a tournament T on X such that the choice set from every element A of X under the rule f coincides with uc (T |A).
The following abuse of notation will be repeated throughout the paper: f (xy) = x instead of f ({x, y}) = {x}, and f (xyz) = (xyz) instead of f ({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}.
Axiomatisation
In this section I characterise the uncovered set choice rule by means of the following axioms:
Axiom 1 (Weak Expansion, WE) Let K be any collection of sets chosen from X and let V be the union of all sets in K. Then any
The above axiom, denoted by WE, states that if an alternative is chosen from every element of a given collection of nonempty sets, then it must still be chosen from their union.
Axiom 2 (Binary Dominance Consistency, BDC) Let A be in X and let x lie in
This axiom, denoted by BDC, asserts that if an alternative is always chosen in pairwise choices, then it should be uniquely chosen from a set containing all those alternatives. An alternative that is always chosen in pairwise comparisons is known as Cordorcet winner.
Similar to WE, BDC has a long history in axiomatic choice theory as well (Sen, 1971) .
The above axiom, denoted by RC, asserts that given a collection of nonempty sets containing x and y, if x is never chosen from every element of that collection, then it will never be the case that x is chosen from their union (equivalently, whenever an alternative x is chosen from A, then for each alternative y of A − {x} x is chosen at least from one shrinked set of A containing x and y). RC is a restriction of the canonical Chernoff axiom because it does not require that an alternative x must be chosen from every set smaller than A (provided x is still available) whenever x is chosen from A.
Axiom 4 (Additive Property, AP) Let x, y be in X, and let A be in X containing
x, but not y. Let x = f (A), x = f (xz) for every z in A − {x}, and z = f (zy) for some
This condition, denoted by AP, states that if an alternative x is a Cordorcet winner in A, and it exists an alternative z of A which is chosen over the new available alternative y, then x must still be chosen from the union of A and y. Observe that if the DM selects only x from {x, y}, only y from {y, z}, only z from {x, z}, AP requires that the choice set coincides with {x, y, z}. Proof. (If ) . Let f be an uncovered set choice rule.
It is obvious that f is resolute and satisfies WE and BDC. Next, RC and AP are checked.
(RC). Let A in X such that |A| > 3, and let x in A; assume that x is not chosen from any B of A x,y (A) for some y in A − {x}. I show that x does not belong to f (A).
Assume, to the contrary, that x is in f (A). Then x lies in uc (T |A), by hypothesis.
Consequently there necessarily exists z of A − {x, y} such that x dominates y in two steps. The alternative x is actually in uc (T |{x, y, z}), by hypothesis x lies in f (xyz), a contradiction.
(AP). Let the premise hold. Since x beats y in at most two steps, it follows that x lies in uc (T |A ∪ {y}). Hence, x is in f (A ∪ {y}), by hypothesis.
(Only if ). Let f be resolute and satisfy Weak Expansion (WE), Binary Dominance Consistency (BDC), Restricted Chernoff (RC), and Additive Property (AP).
Let T be a binary relation on X. Define for all x, y ∈ X, with x 6 = y, xT y iff x = f (xy) .
By definition and the resoluteness of f , it follows that T is asymmetric; given that f is defined on a universal domain, it follows that T is complete. In view of asymmetry and completeness of T , it follows that T is a tournament on X.
Next, I show that f (A) = uc (T |A) for every A of X with |A| > 2.
A proof by induction based on the cardinality of A is provided. Let S be the set of elements of X having at most k alternatives for which this statement holds.
The statement is clearly true for every A of X whenever k < 4, by definition of f , its resoluteness, BDC, and AP.
Then, supposing S contains elements of X that have cardinality k > 4, I show that it contains A of X having cardinality k + 1.
Let x be in f (A). Assume, to the contrary, that x lies in A − uc (T |A). There necessarily exists y of A−{x} such that yT x and xT z only if yT z for every z of A−{x, y}.
Since x does not dominate y in at most two steps, it follows that x does not belong to uc (T |B) for each proper subset B of A x,y (A). Since B is in S, it follows that x is not chosen from B. Since this holds for every B of A x,y (A), then x is not chosen from any element of S containing x and y. By RC x is not in f (A), a contradiction.
Conversely, let x in uc (T |A). I prove that x lies in f (A).
Partition A in D x , S x , and {x}, where D x denotes the set of alternatives of A which are chosen over x in pairwise comparisons, and S x consists of alternatives of A over which x is chosen in binary comparisons.
By BDC it follows directly that x is chosen from A whenever D x is empty. Otherwise, let D x be a nonempty set.
Assume, to the contrary, that x lies in A − f (A). Take any d of D x . As x belongs to uc (T |A − {d}), and A − {d} is an element of S, it follows that x lies in f (A − {d}).
Given d is chosen over x, it follows from definition of T that dT x. In owing of x lies in uc (T |A), it necessarily exists s of S x such that x dominates d in two steps. As x is in uc (T |{d, s, x}), and the set {d, s, x} is an element of S, it follows that x lies in f (dsx).
WE implies x in f (A), a contradiction.
Induction principle now shows that the statement is true for all elements A of X .
Remark 1
The choice consistency conditions used in the preceding theorem are logically independent, as argued next.
For an example violating only the resoluteness condition, let X = {x, y, z}; assume that x is chosen over z, y is chosen over z, and f (xy) = f (X) = xy. Given that uc (T |X) is empty, the choice rule f is not an uncovered choice set rule as the choice set of X under f is nonempty. The resoluteness condition is violated because |f (xy) | 6 = 1.
For an example violating only Binary Dominance Consistency (BDC), let X = {x, y, z};
assume that x is chosen over y and over z, y is chosen over z; finally, let f (X) = xy.
Provided that y does not lie in uc (T |X), the choice rule f is not an uncovered set choice rule. BDC is violated because the choice set of X under f has to be a single unit set, namely {x}, but y is in f (X) as well.
For an example violating only AP, let X = {x, y, z}; assume that x is chosen over y, y is chosen over z, which in turn is chosen over x; assume that f (X) = xy. It follows that the choice rule f is not an uncovered set choice rule as z is in uc (T |{x, y, z}) while it does not lie in f (X). AP is violated because z = f (zx) and x = f (xy), but z is not in f (X).
For an example violating only Weak Expansion (WE), let X = {x, y, z, w}; assume that x is chosen over y and over z, y is chosen over z and w, z over w, and w is chosen over x; assume that f (A) = uc (T |A) for every A in X − X, whereas assume that f (X) = xy.
The choice rule f is not an uncovered set choice rule as w is in uc(T |X), whereas w does not lies in f (X). WE is violated because w is in f (xyw) and f (xzw), but it is not in f (X).
For an example violating only Restricted Chernoff (RC), let X = {x, y, z, w}; assume that x is chosen over y and over z, y is chosen over z and over w, z is chosen over w, which in turn is chosen over x; let f (A) = uc (T |A) for every A in X − X, whereas f (X) = X.
The choice rule f is not an uncovered set choice rule as z is not in uc (T |X). RC is violated because z is not revealed preferred in any proper subset including the alternative y, but it is in f (X).
Discussion
Since the uncovered set of a tournament is a subset of its top-cycle, it seems interesting to investigate the relationship between the axiomatisation provided in theorem 3 and that of top-cycle choice rule which appears in Ehlers et Sprumont (2006) . They axiomatise the top-cycle choice rule using resoluteness, BDC, and two more behavioral regularities:
Weakened Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WWARP), and Weak Contraction Consistency (WCC).
Axiom 5 (Weakened WARP, WWARP) Let x, y be in X, and assume that there is
A in X such that x is in f (A) and y in A − f (A). Then for no B in X it can be that y lies in f (B) and x belongs to B − f (B).
WWARP is a weak version of Arrow's WARP and it states that if the DM selects x from a feasible set and rejects the available alternative y, then for every other feasible set containing x and y he cannot choose y without x.
Axiom 6 (Weak Contraction Consistency, WCC) If A is in X and |A| > 2, and x belongs to f (A), then x lies in f (A − {y}) for some y of A − {x} WCC states that given a feasible set A, the DM can deem x choosable from A only if he has deemed x choosable from some sets A − {y}, for some y of A − {x}. Therefore, this condition assures that nothing can come as a surprise because every alternative deemed choosable from A, where |A| = k + 1, has been deemed choosable in some of its subsets of cardinality k. WCC implies a well known consistency property, namely, Never Chosen (NC) [if A is in X , and y = f (xy) for every y of A − {x}, then f (A) ⊆ A − {x}].
As resoluteness and BDC are necessary and sufficient for the uncovered set choice rule as well, I will focus on WWARP and WCC. Let me begin with WWARP.
Remark 2 WWARP is not necessary for the uncovered set choice rule, as argued next.
Example 4
Assume that the DM is called upon to make a choice from X = {v, w, x, y, z}, and in pairwise choices he deems v choosable over x, y, and z, w choosable over v, y, and z, whereas x over w, y over both x and z, and finally z over x. Suppose that f is an uncovered set choice rule, so that f (A) = uc (T |A) for every A in X . Then x is chosen from X while y is rejected, but y is chosen from {x, y, z} while x is rejected.
The example above shows that x is chosen from a feasible set as long as w is an available alternative: the desirability of x is conditional to the availability of w. Next, I show that resoluteness, BDC, WE, and RC are sufficient for f to satisfy WCC.
Proposition 5 Let A be in X . Let the choice rule f be resolute and satisfy BDC, WE, and RC. Then f satisfies WCC.
Proof. Let the choice rule f be resolute and satisfy BDC, WE and RC. Let A be in X , and let x be in f (A). I show that x is in f (A − {y}) for some y of A − {x}.
Partition A in D x , S x , and {x}, where D x denotes the set of alternatives of A which are chosen over x in pairwise comparisons, and S x consists of alternatives of A over which
x is chosen in binary comparisons.
If D x is empty, it follows from WE that x is in f (A − {y}) for some y in A − {x}.
Otherwise, let |D x | > 1.
I proceed according to whether |A| > 3 or 1 < |A| ≤ 3.
If |D x | = 1, then the stament follows from WE. Otherwise, let |D x | = n, where n > 1.
whenever |B| > 4, I can iterate the application of RC to get that x lies in f (C 1 ), where
and f is resolute. Since x is submissive to n alternatives it follows that the number of C i is n, and
, and so on.
Then it must necessarily be that x = f (sx). This implies that S x is nonempty, and, for every i, s is in C i for some s in S x . The statement follows from WE.
The case |A| = 2 being trivial, let |A| = 3. As x is in f (A) and BDC holds, it follows that |D x | = 1. Then S x is nonempty, and I am home.
Proposition 5 assures that if f satisfies BDC, WE, RC, and is resolute, then for every feasible set A, where |A| = k, the choice rule f always picks from A alternatives which have been chosen from some of its subsets of cardinality k − 1. Moreover, it shows that these consistency conditions are sufficient for f to satisfy NC.
Last but not least observe that RC is sufficient for f to pick alternatives of the top-cycle as shows theorem 3, but it is not necessary for f to be a top-cycle choice rule.
Remark 3 RC is not necessary for f to be a top-cycle choice rule, as argued next.
Example 6 Assume that the DM is called upon to make a choice from X = {w, x, y, z}, and in pairwise choices he deems x choosable over y and z, y choosable over z and w, z choosable over w, which in turn is deemed choosable over x; let f (A) coincides with the top-cycle of T |A for every A in X . Then z is in f (X), but z is never deemed choosable by the DM whenever y is an available alternative.
Concluding comments
This paper formalises a one-reason decision making which has been extensively studied in voting theory (Miller (1980) ): the uncovered set rule.
It has the advantage in that it accounts for cyclic and context-dependent choices whilst preserving some form of the maximality of a tournament; its central features are simplicity and reasonableness. It is simple to use because it corresponds to the naive idea that the choosable alternative should have the property to dominate every other available one in at most two pairwise choices. It is a reasonable choice rule because it can be tested by some mild consistency properties.
This approach can be contrasted with other choice procedures suggested recently. 6 This procedure is able to explain both kinds of violations of WARP, but it does not necessarily preserve the maximality hypothesis suggested here. 6 Rubinstein et Salant (2006) charcaterise the same choice procedure in an enriched framework.
